TextAttack: A Framework for Adversarial Attacks, Data Augmentation, and
  Adversarial Training in NLP by Morris, John X. et al.
TextAttack: A Framework for Adversarial Attacks in Natural Language
Processing
John X. Morris Eli Lifland Jin Yong Yoo Yanjun Qi
University of Virginia
https://textattack.org
Abstract
TextAttack is a library for running adversar-
ial attacks against natural language process-
ing (NLP) models. TextAttack builds at-
tacks from four components: a search method,
goal function, transformation, and set of con-
straints. Researchers can use these compo-
nents to easily assemble new attacks. Individ-
ual components can be isolated and compared
for easier ablation studies. TextAttack cur-
rently supports attacks on models trained for
text classification and entailment across a va-
riety of datasets. Additionally, TextAttack’s
modular design makes it easily extensible to
new NLP tasks, models, and attack strategies.
TextAttack code and tutorials are available at
https://github.com/QData/TextAttack.
1 Introduction
Szegedy et al. (2014) discovered that adversarial
examples can be generated to fool deep neural net-
works for image classification. Since then, re-
searchers have discovered ways of generating ad-
versarial examples for many other tasks, such as
speech recognition and text classification. Within
the natural language community, there has been
growing interest in methods for generating adver-
sarial examples for NLP models (Zhang et al.,
2019b).
Many attack methods have been suggested for
NLP models, ranging from greedy methods (Jin
et al., 2019) to methods based on Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling (Zhang et al.,
2019a). These attacks are difficult to compare
since they all reside in different code repositories
and often are evaluated on different models and
enforce linguistic constraints differently.
We provide a unified definition of NLP attacks
as the composition of four components: a goal
function, a search method, a transformation, and
an optional list of constraints. We present Tex-
tAttack, a software library structured around these
components. TextAttack implements examples of
each component drawn from the literature. Its
modular design enables researchers to develop
new components and immediately test them in the
context of an attack. We use TextAttack to as-
semble attacks from the literature, including those
from (Gao et al., 2018), (Alzantot et al., 2018), and
(Jin et al., 2019).
2 Composition of an NLP Attack
TextAttack aims to implement attacks which,
given an NLP Model F , attempt to perturb an
input sequence x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) to pertur-
bation sequence xadv such that xadv satisfies a
goal function and adheres to certain linguistic con-
straints.
To actually generate such xadv, we need to mod-
ify the input text x, which can be done by adding
new xi, deleting existing xi, or replacing xi with
new x′i. Note that xi can either be a word or a char-
acter, depending on the level of transformation.
However, the decision space for choosing a
transformation is huge. Even if limiting our-
selves to replacements and consider only the best
k replacements, there are km possible transforma-
tions for generating xadv. It becomes infeasible
to consider every potential transformation, espe-
cially as m gets larger (here m denotes the sen-
tence length).
Therefore, attacking an NLP model becomes a
combinatorial search problem in which we search
within (all) potential transformations to find a set
of transformations for generating xadv: so that
xadv satisfies conditions defining an adversarial
example. In summary, each attack can be con-
structed from four components:
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Transformation
• WordEmbeddingDistance(min_cos_sim=0.5)
• PartOfSpeech(verb_noun_swap=True)
• UniversalSentenceEncoder(
   metric=’angular', thresh=0.904458599)
Search Method
Constraints
Goal Function UntargetedClassification
• WordsPerturbedPercentage(max_perc=20)
• WordEmbeddingDistance(max_mse=0.5)
• GoogleLanguageModel(n_per_index=4)
Alzantot et al. (2018)
UntargetedClassification
GreedyWordSwapWordImportanceRanking
WordSwapEmbedding(embedding=’cf’)
Jin et al. (2019)
GeneticAlgorithmWordSwap
WordSwapEmbedding(embedding=’cf’)
Figure 1: TextAttack builds NLP attacks from a goal function, search method, transformation, and list of con-
straints. This shows attacks from Alzantot et al. (2018) and Jin et al. (2019) created using TextAttack modules.
1. A task-specific goal function that defines at-
tack success in terms of the model outputs.
2. A number of constraints that determine if a
perturbation is valid with respect to the orig-
inal input.
3. A transformation that, given an input, gen-
erates a set of potential perturbations.
4. A search method that successively queries
the model and selects promising perturba-
tions from a set of transformations.
2.1 Goal Functions
A goal function takes an input x and determines
whether the attack is finished. Goal functions vary
by task. For example, the goal function for gen-
erating untargeted attacks on classification can be
denoted as follows:
G(x) := {argmaxF (x) 6= original class}
(1)
Alternatively we can use the following goal func-
tion for targeted attacks on classification:
G(x) := {argmaxF (x) = target class} (2)
2.2 Constraints
An input is only considered valid if it satisfies each
of the attack’s constraints. TextAttack currently
implements three types of constraints.
2.2.1 Edit distance
These constraints measure something about the
similarity between x and x adv on the character
level. TextAttack supports the following edit dis-
tance constraints:
• Maximum BLEU score difference (Papineni
et al., 2001)
• Maximum chrF score difference (Popovic,
2015)
• Maximum METEOR score difference (Agar-
wal and Lavie, 2008)
• Maximum Levenshtein edit distance
• Maximum percentage of words changed
2.2.2 Grammaticality
These constraints are typically intended to prevent
the attack from creating perturbations which in-
troduce grammatical errors. TextAttack currently
supports the following constraints on grammati-
cality:
• Maximum number of grammatical errors in-
duced, as measured by LanguageTool (Naber
et al.)
• Part-of-speech consistency
2.2.3 Semantics
These constraints attempt to preserve meaning be-
tween x and x adv. TextAttack currently provides
the following built-in semantic constraints:
• Maximum swapped word embedding dis-
tance (or minimum cosine similarity)
• Sentence Encoders
– Universal Sentence Encoder (Cer et al.,
2018)
– InferSent (Conneau et al., 2017)
– BERT trained for semantic similarity
(Reimers and Gurevych, 2019)
• Language Models
– Google 1-billion words language model
(Jo´zefowicz et al., 2016)
2.3 Transformations
A transformation takes an input and returns a set
of potential perturbations. The transformation is
agnostic of goal function and constraint(s): it re-
turns all potential transformations.
We categorize transformations into two kinds:
white-box and black-box. White-box transforma-
tions have access to the model and can query
it or examine its parameters to help determine
the transformation. For example, Ebrahimi et al.
(2017) determines potential replacement words
based on the gradient of the one-hot input vector
at the position of the swap. Black-box transforma-
tions determine the potential perturbations without
any knowledge of the model.
TextAttack currently supports the following
transformations:
• Word swap with nearest neighbors in the
counter-fitted embedding space (et al., 2016)
• WordNet word swap (Miller et al., 1990)
• Word swap with characters transformed (Gao
et al., 2018):
– Character deleted
– Neighboring characters swapped
– Random character inserted
– Character substituted with a random
character
– Character substituted with a homoglyph
• Composite transformation: returns the results
of multiple transformations
2.4 Search Methods
The search method aims to find a perturbation
that achieves the goal and satisfies all constraints.
Many combinatorial search methods have been
proposed for this process. TextAttack has imple-
mented a selection of the most popular ones:
• Greedy with Word Importance Ranking.
Rank all words according to some ranking
function. Swap words one at a time in order
of decreasing importance.
• Beam Search. Initially score transforma-
tions at all positions in the input. Take the top
b transformations (where b is a hyperparam-
eter known as the ”beam width”) and iterate,
looking at transformations of all sequences in
the beam.
• Genetic Algorithm. An implementation of
the algorithm proposed by Alzantot et al.
(2018). Iteratively alters the population
through greedy perturbation of each popula-
tion member and crossover between popula-
tion numbers, with preference to the more
successful members of the population.
3 Implementations of Existing Methods
TextAttack’s modular design allows us to im-
plement many different attacks from past work
in a shared library, often by adding only one or
two new components. Table 1 categorizes past
work based on their search methods, goal func-
tions, transformations, and constraints. Figure ??
presents a set of TextAttack modules we used to
re-implement attacks from Alzantot et al. (2018)
and Jin et al. (2019).
4 TextAttack Under the Hood
TextAttack is optimized under-the-hood to make
implementing and running adversarial attacks both
simple and fast.
TokenizedText. A common problem with im-
plementations of NLP attacks is that the original
text is discarded after tokenization; thus, the trans-
formation is performed on the tokenized version
of the text. This causes issues with capitalization
and word segmentation. Sometimes attacks swap
a piece of a word for a complete word (for exam-
ple, transforming “aren’t” into “aren’too”).
TextAttack stores each input as a Tokenized-
Text object which contains the original text, the
tokenized input, and helper methods for trans-
forming the text while retaining tokenization. In-
stead of strings or tensors, classes in TextAttack
operate primarily on TokenizedText objects.
Caching. Some search methods encounter the
same input at different points in the search. In
these cases, it is wise to pre-store values to avoid
unnecessary computation. For each input ex-
amined during the attack, TextAttack caches its
model output, as well as the whether or not it
passed all of the constraints. For some search
methods, this memoization can save a significant
amount of time.1
Models, tokenizers, and datasets. We include
dataset samples as well as pre-trained models and
1Caching alone speeds up the genetic algorithm of Alzan-
tot et al. (2018) by a factor of 5.
Paper Search Method Transformation Goal Function Constraints
HotFlip (word swap)
(Ebrahimi et al., 2017)
Beam search Gradient-Based Word
Swap
Untargeted
Classification
Word Embedding
Cosine Similarity,
Part-of-speech
match, Number of
words perturbed
DeepWordBug
(Gao et al., 2018)
Greedy-WIR {Character Insertion,
Character Deletion,
Character Swap,
Character
Substitution}*
{Untargeted,
Targeted}
Classification
Levenshtein edit
distance
Kuleshov
(Kuleshov et al., 2018)
Greedy word swap Counter-fitted word
embedding swap
Untargeted
Classification
Thought vector
encoding cosine
similarity,
Language model
similarity
probability
Alzantot
(Alzantot et al., 2018)
Genetic Algorithm Counter-fitted word
embedding swap
Untargeted
{Classification,
Entailment}
Percentage of
words perturbed,
Google Language
Model perplexity,
Word embedding
distance
TextBugger (black-box)
(Li et al., 2019)
Greedy-WIR {Character Insertion,
Character Deletion,
Character Swap,
Character
Substitution}*
Untargeted
Classification
USE sentence
encoding cosine
similarity
TextFooler
(Jin et al., 2019)
Greedy-WIR Counter-fitted word
embedding swap
Untargeted
{Classification,
Entailment}
Word Embedding
Distance,
Part-of-speech
match, USE
sentence encoding
cosine similarity
BAE
(Garg and
Ramakrishnan, 2020)
Greedy-WIR BERT Masked Token
Prediction
Untargeted
Classification
USE sentence
encoding cosine
similarity
Table 1: Some prior work categorized within our framework: search method, transformation, goal function, con-
straints.
* indicates a composition of multiple transformations
the corresponding tokenizers for common classi-
fication and entailment datasets. Our models and
data are stored on Amazon S3 and automatically
downloaded when invoked from TextAttack.
5 Using TextAttack for Research
Testing robustness of a model. An important
use case for TextAttack is testing the robustness
of an existing NLP model. TextAttack is library-
agnostic, meaning that it can run attacks on mod-
els implemented in any deep learning framework.
Model objects must be able to take in a tensor of
IDs and return an output that can be processed by
the goal function. For example, classification and
entailment models return an array of scores. To-
kenizers must be implement a single method, en-
code(), which takes a string input and returns a
list or tensor of IDs. These IDs will be stored on
the TokenizedText object and passed to the model
during inference.
Creating a new attack. TextAttack con-
tains base abstract classes that implement
the required functionality of each compo-
nent: TextAttack.goal functions.GoalFunction,
TextAttack.constraints.Constraint, TextAt-
tack.transformations.Transformation, and
TextAttack.attack methods.Attack.2 Some
implementations may be simple as adding a
subclass with a single new function. Other times,
researchers may integrate several new components
to create a new attack.
Modes of execution. TextAttack is available
as a Python package from GitHub3. TextAttack
is also available for use through our demo web
app. Most researchers will prefer the command-
2Search methods are subclasses the Attack class.
3https://github.com/QData/TextAttack
line mode as it allows for full customization and
use of hardware. However, for demonstration pur-
poses or for attacking a single sample, the web in-
terface will suffice.
Visualizing attack results. TextAttack sup-
ports several different output formats for attack re-
sults:
• Printing results to stdout
• Printing to a text file or CSV
• Printing attack results to an HTML table
• Writing a table of attack results to a Visdom
visualization server
• Presenting results via our demo web app
6 Related Work
We draw inspiration from the Transformers li-
brary (Wolf et al., 2019) as an example of a
well-designed Natural Language Processing li-
brary. Some of the models and tokenizers are im-
plemented using Transformers.
cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2018) is a library
for constructing adversarial examples for com-
puter vision models. Like cleverhans, we aim to
provide methods that generate adversarial exam-
ples across a variety of models and datasets. In
some sense, TextAttack strives to be a solution
like cleverhans for the NLP community. Like clev-
erhans, attacks in TextAttack all implement a base
Attack class. However, while cleverhans imple-
ments many disparate attacks in separate modules,
TextAttack builds attacks from a library of shared
components.
There are some existing open-source libraries
related to adversarial examples in NLP. Trick-
ster proposes a method for attacking NLP models
based on graph search, but lacks the ability to en-
sure that generated examples satisfy a given con-
straint (Kulynych et al., 2018). TEAPOT is a li-
brary for evaluating adversarial perturbations on
text, but only supports the application of ngram-
based comparisons for evaluating attacks on ma-
chine translation models (Michel et al., 2019).
Most recently, AllenNLP Interpret includes func-
tionality for running adversarial attacks on NLP
models, but is intended only for the purpose of in-
terpretability, and only supports attacks via input-
reduction or greedy gradient-based word swap
(Wallace et al., 2019). TextAttack has a broader
scope than any of these libraries: it is designed to
be extendable to any NLP attack.
7 Conclusion
We presented TextAttack, an open-source library
for testing the robustness of NLP models. Tex-
tAttack defines an attack in four modules: a goal
function, a list of constraints, a transformation,
and a search method. This allows us to compose
attacks from previous work from these modules
and compare them in a shared environment.
As new attacks are developed, we will add their
components to TextAttack. We look forward to a
future in which it is easier to develop and compare
NLP attacks.
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